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01  Executive Summary 
This report examines the role played by terrestrial circuits (or 'tails') in the delivery of 
satellite services, and  identifies how changes in  the supply conditions of these circuits 
would affect the satellite market.  It then  considers how such changes in  the satellite 
services market might impact on the businesses of  the European TOs. 
Five satellite service architectures have been considered in this study: one way star data 
services, interactive star data services, rooftop to rooftop VSAT services, business TV 
services and broadcast TV uplink.  Three of  these architectures make significant use of 
t~rrestria1 leased  lines  in  the  delivery  of their  service:  one way  star data  networks, 
interactive star data networks,  and  TV uplinking services.  Outline cost models have 
been developed for each of  these cases and it  has been found that for typical European 
satellite networks leased lines constitute on average 5-10% of the total cost of  service 
prOVISIOn. 
Satellite services compete for users in the telecommunications market against terrestrial 
services offered by the TOs.  Users make their choice between satellite and terrestrial 
services on the basis of  five major criteria: 
•  Is the service fit for the purpose for which it is to be used? 
•  Is  the  price  of the  service  appropriate  to  the  utility  being  sought,  and  ts  it 
competitive? 
•  Can the service be delivered to meet the required timescale? 
•  Is the quality of  service sufficiently high to meet the requirements of  the application 
and the expectations of  the customer? 
•  Is the supplier of  the service perceived as being credible? 
These factors  influence  the  user's  decision  as  to whether to purchase a  service and 
which service to purchase.  Alterations to the fit of  a given service against these criteria 
wiJI therefore have an impact on market demand. 
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Price reductions in leased circuits resulting from the ONP Directive on leased lines and 
from  alternative infrastructure liberalisation  are  likely  to  provide  marginal  benefits  to 
satellite service operators and  users.  The market  will  also  benefit  to a degree  from 
enhanced availability and  quality of sen·ice arising from  increased  competition within 
the leased line sector.  We believe the most significant positive impact will  come from 
the change in mindset amongst the user base that alternative infrastructure liberalisation 
'"rill  promote.  Satellite  services  and  satellite  service  providers  will  benefit  from 
increased  readiness on the pan. of users to accept  non-TO service offerings:  satell_ite 
solutions will become more credible and hence more widely adopted. 
However,  another  likely  effect  of alternative  infrastructure  liberalisation  will  be to 
improve  the  perceived  match  between  terrestrial  leased  line  alternatives  and  users 
needs.  Increased competition between terrestrial service providers will  reduce prices 
and  enhance  the  choice  and  availability  of services.  These  factors  will  limit  the 
attractiveness of  the satellite service as perceived by the user~ affecting in panicular the 
market for point to point services. such as IBS and SMS. 
We conclude that,  on balance.  the net  impact  on  the  satellite services market  of the 
liberalisation of terrestrial tails  for satellite services is  like1y  to be minimal.  We also 
believe that the effect of  these measures on EC TOs is likely to be minimal.  Change in 
the size of  the satellite services market resulting from  liberaJisation will be probably be 
insignificant and cenainly less than  10%.  As the satellite market constitutes Jess than 
0.3% of  total corporate telecoms spend~ a worst case scenario for the TOs wilJ be a loss 
of market share of  0.03%~ or ECU  I  0 million.  to satellite service suppliers.  A Joss of 
this magnitude will have no significant impact on the TOs' overall business. 
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I I  Introduction· 
Analysys is pleased to  present  to  CEC DGXIII  this  study of the  impact  of alternative 
infrastructure liberalisation on satellite services within the European Community. 
The  objective  of the  study  is  to  examine  the  impact  of liberalising  alternative 
infrastructure  and  cable  TV  netv.'orks  on  the  market  for  satellite  services.  Such 
liberalisation  v.rill  primarily affect  the  supply  (quantity  and  price)  of terrestrial  circuits 
used  in  the  supply  of satellite  services.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  identify  the 
relationship between terrestrial  circuits and  the  provision  of satellite services;  possible 
changes  in  the  supply  conditions  of terrestrial  circuits~  and  any  repercussions  these 
changes may have for the attractiveness of  satellite services to users. 
The report is structured as foJJows: 
•  Section  2 examines  the  market  for  satellite  services.  identifying  the  key  criteria 
which influence a user's decision to purchase services in that market. 
•  Section  3 considers  the  role  that  terrestrial  leased  lines  play  in  the  provision  of 
different types of satellite services,  and,  in  particular.  their significance  in  the cost 
base of  these services. 
•  Section  4  estimates  the  impact  of liberalisation  of terrestrial  tails  for  satellite 
services  on  two  key  categories  of m~rket player:  the  satellite  service  providers 
themselves, and the EC TOs generally. 
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2/ Key Drivers in the Market for Satellite Services 
Satellite service providers compete for  customers  in  the  telecommunications  market 
against  terrestrial  service  providers.  Users  in  this  market  can  choose from  a  broad 
selection of services:  PSTN, PSDN, leased  lines.  VPN. one way and  two way VSAT 
services9  etc.  Some of these services are direct substitutes, while  others offer unique 
characteristics that  make  them  particularly  suitable for a specific purpose.  In either 
situation, the user chooses between services judging them against a series of criteria as 
illustrated in Exhibit  1.  These criteria are the key drivers of  demand  i_n  the market. 
EXHIBIT 1:  The Dynan1ics qf  the Telt!COI71S Sen,ices Market 
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The service chosen must have transmission characteristics which 
mee_t the basic needs of  the user.  These might include a specific 
data  rate,  a  requirement  for  a  continuous  or  periodic 
connection.  a  minimum  time  delay  across  the  link,  or 
confonnance to local  planning regulations.  If a service fails  to 
meet  any  fundamental  requirements  in  this  category,  it  can  be 
immediately eliminated as a possible option. 
Ceteris  paribus  price  is  likely  to  be  deciding  factor  in  a 
purchasing decision.  However,  in  certain  situations  price  will 
sometimes  be  less  significant  than  another  factor.  such  as 
reliability.  Variations  between  market  sectors  are  discussed 
below. 
Any delay  in  the  installation of a service may  well  influence a 
user  to  adopt  an  alternative  solution  to  his  communications 
requirements. 
This  is  perhaps  the  greatest  variable  vlithin  telecoms  service 
provision. both between service options and between providers, 
and hence it  is the most intense area of  competition.  Quality of 
service is  taken  here  to  include  reliability  of supply  (measured 
by  mean  time  to  failure  and  mean  time  to  restoration),  delay 
time  over the  link.  error rates.  and  quality  of after-saJes  care. 
The  emphasis  placed  on  service  quality  as  a  criterion  for 
purchasing  decisions  depends  on  both  the  size  of  the 
organisation  the  buyer  represents.  and  the  nature  of the 
application. 
A supplier  organisation  must  seem  credible  to  the  customer. 
Few organisations  are  willing  to  purchase  telecommunications 
services  from  a  new  supplier  who  is  not  established  in  the 
marketplace. 
Obviously the relative importance to the purchaser of  these factors varies from case to 
case.  For  many  large  user  organisations.  credibility  of the  supplier  and  quality  of 
service .are the most important  elements,  ahead  of availability  and  price.  With  large 
networks to manage and many users dependent on those networks, telecoms managers 
in  large  companies  prefer  suppliers  who  can  offer  them  a  high  level  of customer 
support.·  The more  a supplier can  offer  in  terms of service  quality,  reliability,  and  a 
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pedigree  to  support  these  claims.  the  more  likely  it  is  to  \\rin  business.  Large  user 
organisations do not like dealing with more than perhaps two suppliers1 and  will  pay a 
premium for  quality  and  security.  Nevertheless.  if the  discount  offered  by  a credible 
alternative service is significant enough, then that senice has to be considered seriously. 
Many smaller companies are more price sensitive and  hence more receptive to cheaper 
service  alternatives~.  This category of  user will often switch proVider for a smaller price 
incentive than would be the case \\'ith a large corporate user. 
Any change in the supply conditions of  terrestrial circuits will alter the attractiveness of 
satellite services  to  these  end  users.  as judged  by  the  above  criteria.  Some specific 
effects of  liberalising alternative infrastructures are discussed in Section 4. 
1  Telecoms User Association Surwy. Financial Tim.:s. 11/11193. 
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3/ The Role of  Terrestrial Circuits in the Provision of 
Satellite Services 
There are five broad categories of  satellite service architecture: 
•  one way star data network 
•  int~ractive star data network 
•  roof-top to roof-top (point to point) VSAT services 
•  one way business TV network 
•  TV uplink services 
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Terrestrial  tails  play  an  integral  part  in  the  provision  of three  of these  ~ve service 
categories: one· way star VSATs, two way star VSATs. and TV uplinking.  The circuits 
are  used  to  interconnect  a  customer's  premises  with  the  satellite  transmitting  or 
receiving terminal, where that terminal is remote from the premises.  As such they have 
an impact on the availability, quality, reliability, and cost of  the final offering. 
Roof-top  to  roof-top  and  business  TV  services  generally  do  not  employ  terrestrial 
circuits.  As  the  term  implies,  roof-top  to  roof-top  services  connect  the  customer 
directly  to  the  satellite.  There  are  occasions  where  one  site  is  coMected  to  a 
neighbouring site with a terminal using a terrestrial TO supplied circuit, but the circuit 
is  usually  short  and  therefore  relatively  cheap,  and  cases  in  which  this  occurs  are 
infrequent.  This architecture has not therefore been considered in this study. 
In business TV networks, 95% of program material is taped before transmission.  The 
tape is then supplied directly to the uplinking site for transmission.  In the remaining So/o 
of cases, shon period circuits are installed,  usually satellite SNG type coMections or 
microwave links.  Changes in the leased line market are not likely to impact directly on 
the economics or attractiveness of  either option. 
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Identifying the costs of terrestrial circuit pro\·ision 
Cost models of  the three services identified above were developed for typical European 
service providers3.  Details of these models  are given  in  Annex  A to this  report.  In 
general,  ~sts of space segment, remote terminals and  terrestrial tails are three of the 
most significant cost elements in the provision of  satellite services.  For each model, the 
proportion of  cost attributable to the terrestrial leased circuits was  calculated~ as shown 
in Exhibit 2 below. 
EXHIBIT2:  Cost Breakdown in Satellite Sen,ices 
Space segment 
costs 
Remote terminal 
costs 
Other service 
elements 
()ne way data 
Sc:n·icc: 
9o/o 
41% 
43
1Yu 
One way star data seM~ices 
Interactive data 
SC:n1iCI! 
17% 
15% 
63% 
TV uplink 
88% 
N/A 
One  way  data  services  are  typically  delivered  \·ia  a  central  hub,  located  Y-'ithin  an 
industrialised region.  Whilst  large networks may have a dedicated hub located at  the 
customer's headquarters~ in most cases costs are minimised by sharing one hub between 
a number of customers.  This usually means that each  customer requires a terrestrial 
circuit to connect the site generating data to the uplink station. 
In our model of  this networ~ the service provider is assumed to have approximately 1  0 
customers sharing a hub, each located on average SOkm from that uplink station.  Each 
customer has approximately 200 remote terminals  sited  across  Europe.  The service 
data rate in each case is  128kbit/s.  Average charges for this service are assumed to be 
ECU 300 per tenninaJ per month. 
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EXHIBIT 3: 
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Remote 
Customer 
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Data is transmitted to the uplinking station on two 64kbit/s circuits costing ECU 32 000 
per annum (Deutsche Telekom rates).  Capital costs for installing and  commissioning 
the hub  are assumed to be approximately ECU  I  million.  Remote  ~erminal costs are 
typically  ECU  3000  per  terminal-a.  Capacity  on  a  36MHz Eutelsat  transponder  is 
purchased by the service provider in association with other organisations.  It is assumed 
that he pays for space segment capacity under this system on a pro-rata basis, and that 
the transponder is 75% utilised. 
Under these assumptions, the terrestrial circuit  accounts for approximately 7% of the 
total  costs.  The  most  expensive  element  of the  network  are  the  receive  terminals, 
accounting for 40% of  total costs. 
Interactive VSAT sen1ices 
The interactive network architecture is identical to that of the one way system except 
that aU  data paths are bi-directional.  The typical  service provider in  this scenario is 
assumed to have 4 customers, again located on average 50km from  the uplink station. 
Each  customer  network  is  assumed  to  have  55  remote  terminals,  served  with  one 
outbound link at 128kbit/s and three inbound channels at 64kbit/s.  Average charges for 
this service are estimated at ECU 1500 per terminal per month. 
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EXHIBIT 4: 
Interactive star 
data services 
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Remote 
Customer 
Sites 
Space segment capacity is purchased on the same basis as in the one-way model.  The 
cost of  the central hub has increased from ECU  1 million to ECU 2. 8 million under the 
assumption that more extensive monitoring and  data processing equipment is required. 
Tenninal  costs  have  also  increased,  as  both  transmit  and  receive  capability  must  be 
instaUed.  The  network  is  again  fed  from  ·the  n1ain  customer  site  with  two  50km 
64kbit/s circuits casted at German rates. 
Under these assumptions,  the terrestrial  circuit  accounts for  approximately  5% of the 
total costs.  Space segment and terminal costs each account for about  15% of  the total. 
TV uplink selt'ices 
This model examines the use of a 30km 34f\1bit/s circuit to deliver a TV channel  from 
its originating studio to an uplink station for broadcasting. 
Hub  costs are  similar  to the  one  way  data  case  (ECU  1 million).  The  cost  of the 
terrestrial circuit  increases dramaticaJly  (nearly  ECl! 500 000  per annum),  but  space 
segment costs rise even more sharply as a full transponder is now being employed.  The 
net result is that the terrestrial circuit again accounts for only 7% of  total costs.  Space 
segment costs are the most expensive factor at nearly 90% of  total costs. · 
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EXHIBIT 5: 
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From this analysis we conclude that terrestrial circuits comprise only 5-l 0% of  the total 
cost  of provision  of a  satellite  service.  As  a  result  of the  EC  Directive  on  the 
application  of Ol\TP  to  leased  lines~  which  requires  TOs  to  move  towards  a  cost 
orientation, the prices for terrestrial circuits wiJI fall.  The rate of  fall  will be determined 
by the rate of liberalisation of the sector. the implementation of new technology (such 
as SOH)~ and operating efficiency improvements.  Analysys has undertaken a number of 
studies looking at leased circuit prices and concludes that in most EC countries (not the 
UK),  prices could  fall  by  30%-50%.  Such  a fall  \vould  reduce  the  total  costs of a 
VSAT service by 2o/o-5% and would reduce the significance of  terrestrial tails to 5% or 
less ofthe total costs. 
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4/ Impact ofth~  Liberal~sation of  Terrestrial 
Infrastructure for the Provision of  Satellite Services 
4.1  IMPACI' ON THE SATELLITE SERVICES l\tARKET 
PagtlJ 
Having established  that terrestrial  tails  are major  elements  in  the  delivery of several 
types of  satellite service. including point to multipoint services, it is possible to examine 
the impact  which  liberalisation  of alternative  terrestrial  net\7\'0rks  would  have  ~n the 
delivery of  such services. 
Some idea of  the impact of competition on leased lines can be gained by reference to 
markets where these services are already subject to competition, such as the UK and 
the US~  where competition  has  existed  for  I  0 to  15  years.  Results have included: 
reduced cost of  provision~; shorter waiting time for the installation of  circuits; increased 
variety  of services  available  to  the  end  user;  and  improved  maintenance  and  repair 
services (mean time to fault notification, mean time to repair, etc.).  We consider below 
the effect that changes of  this type in terrestrial circuit supply conditions might have on 
the user's buying criteria. 
5  UK lased line prices are 1}-pic:;ally 1/3 those in Ocnn:al1)· for 64kbitls circuits. and I  IS  fur lMbil!s circuits. US lcued line prices 
are SO% less again. 
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Any  impact  on  the  'fit  for  purpose'  criterion  is  likely  to  be 
negative  for  point  to  point  satellite  services.  Users  currently 
choose  satellite  because  of the  availability  of n  x  64kbitls 
services,  and  the more rapid  deployment  of these services (TO 
bypass).  Point  to  point  satellite  services  will  Jose  these 
distinctive  characteristics  in  an  environment  \vhere  terrestrial 
substitutes are more  competitive.  Point  to  multipoint  services 
are likely to be enhanced  by the better  av~ilability and  reduced 
down time of  terrestrial tails. 
Reduction  in  leased  line  prices  will  have  a marginally  positive 
effect  on  the  attractiveness  of point  to  multipoint  satellite 
services.  The  discussion  in  Section  3 illustrates  that  a  50% 
reduction  in  leased  line prices  will  result  in  a 5%  reduction  in 
the price of  satellite services.  However, the reduction in leased 
line  prices  will  have  a strongly ·negative  impact  on  the  price 
competitiveness  of national  and  international  satellite  point  to 
point services. 
Both  availability  and  quality  of satellite  services  are  likely  to 
benefit  only  marginally  from  increased  availability  of  the 
terrestrial tail.  ·As the link is only part of  the overall circuit, the 
increase  in  quality  of service  is  likely  to  be  limited.  In  a 
competitive  environment  the  service  provider  will  have 
increased  leverage  on  the circuit  provider.  as  he  could  choose 
an  alternative  supplier.  a sanction  that  is  not  open  to  him  at 
present.  However. there is no evidence to suggest that services 
are now severely  hindered  by  delays  in  circuit  supply.  or poor 
quality links to the hubs. 
We believe this  is  the  area  where the  satellite service provider 
may gain most.  In much of  Europe. there is still a reluctance to 
deal  with anyone other than the dominant TO for the supply of 
communication services.  Users are not yet comfortable with the 
concept  of an  alternative  organisation  offering  a reliable  and 
long term service.  However.  in markets where competition has 
existed for some time. this prejudice has diminished. with users 
in  all sectors recognising that other organisations can offer not 
only comparable services  but  often  more  appropriate and  cost 
effective services.  Changed  attitudes within  the user base will 
benefit independent suppliers in the satellite services market. 
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In summary, reductions in the price of  terrestrial tails will  provide a marginal benefit to 
satellite service providers  in  some supply circumstances,  such as  in  the absence of a 
direct terrestrial substitute.  Availability. and quality of  service, v.rill be enhanced.  Most 
importantly however. liberalisation of  alternative terrestrial infrastructure should help to 
reduce user prejudices against service offerings from bodies other than the TOs. 
However,  it  is  likely  that  liberalisation  of alternative  terrestrial  infrastructure  will 
improve the perceived  match  between terrestrial  alternatives and  users  needs.  Prioe 
competition between terrestrial services will  also increase.  These two factors will limit 
the attractiveness of  the satellite service as perceived by the user. 
4.2  IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION ON EC TOS 
The  total  EC  telecommunications  sef"\.ices  market  is  worth  approximately 
ECU 77 billion.  of which  business  revenues  have  been  estimated  at ECU  41  billion. 
Satellite  services  constitute  ECU  1  10  mi11ion,  ie  only  0.3°/o  of  business 
telecommunications  services.  A  detailed  examination  of the  stru·cture  of the  EC 
telecommunications market is given in Annex B to this report. 
The CEC  is  concerned  about the impact  of alternative infrastructure liberalisation on 
TO revenues and  particularly on the corporate net\vork and  closed user group (CUG) 
markets.  DGIV has defined these markets6 as: 
Corporate network 
Govemmenr CUG 
Industry Sector 
CUG 
'A  single organisation  cncomp~sing distinct legal  entities~ such as a 
company and  its subsidiaries or its  branches in  other Member States 
incorporated under the rele\'3nt domestic company law'. 
'Different  institutions  or  services  of  international  and  inter-
governmental org:lnis:uions'. 
'A  common  activity  network.  In  this  case,  the  link  bem-een  the 
members  of the group  is  a common  business  activity (in the broad 
understanding of the  concept).  Examples of activities likely to falJ 
into  this  category  are  fund  transfers  for  the  banking  industry, 
resei"V3tion  systems  for  airlines,  infonnati_on  transfers  between 
universities involved  in  a common  research project,  re-insurance for 
the  insurance  industry,  inter-library  activities,  conunon  design 
projects'. 
6  Internal memorandum. OOJV. 1993. 
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Customer/supplier 
and  Joint Venture 
CUGs 
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'An integrated business community or 'business web'  encompassing a 
corporation..  partially  O\\ll~  subsidiaries,  its  employees  working 
outside  comp:my  premises,  1113jor  suppliers  and  customers  (for 
example, qualified users in support of another business objective such 
as a technical help desk), or dealers'. 
Estimates  for  the  size  of each  of these  corporate  network  and  CUG  segments  are 
summarised  in  Exhibit  6.  AnaJysys  has  sought  to  distinguish  between  customer/ 
supplier  CUGs,  and  joint  vent~re CUGs.·  Full  details  of the  methodology  used  are 
provided in Annex B. 
EXHIBIT6:  Total EC Telecoms .. \jJend hy llwtr Group 
Sector  Telecoms l]JI!nd.  Te/econ1s Spend, 
ECll billions  Percentage total 
Business revenues 
Corporate Networks  13.0  32% 
Industry Sector CUG  2.6  6% 
Government CUG  0.7  2% 
Customer/Supplier CUG  22.0  54% 
Joint Venture CUG  0.4  1% 
Other revenue sources  2.1  5% 
An analysis of the satellite services market  shov.'s that customers come primarily from 
the corporate  netwo~:k (  eg Banco  Comercial  Ponugues.  Elf Aquitaine,  \\'illiam Hill); 
goven1ment Cl!G (eg Italian  Social  Security)~ and  industry' sector Cl!G (eg  Reuters, 
CQG International)  segments.  These  segments  have  a combined  telecoms  spend  of 
ECU 16 billion. 
The liberalisation of  the provision of  satellite terrestrial tails could lead directly to a 5% 
reduction  in  the  cost of point  to  multipoint  sateiJite  services.  If the liberalisation of 
terrestrial infrastructure is allowed  only where it  is  used  as  pan of a  sat~Ilite service, 
then this is likely to have  a positive impact  on  the satellite market.  This  impact  will 
arise both from direct price reductions, and from  the improved competitive position of 
these services in relation to terrestrial circuits.  However, the magnitude of  the impact 
will  be small  since,  as  we  have  argued  elsewhere,  price  is  not  always  the  dominant 
factor in  the purchasing decision.  If full  liberalisation  of terrestrial  infrastructure  is 
permitted,  this  wiU  significantly  reduce the competitiveness of point  to point  satellite 
services _(such  as  IBS  and  SMS),  and  hence  tend  to reduce  the  size of the  satellite 
market. 
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We conclude that, on balance, the net  impact  on the EC TOs of liberalising alternative 
infrastructure under either of  the t"'O scenarios described above is likely to be minimal. 
Certainly, any change in the size of  the satellite se~ices market will be less than 10% in 
either direction.  As this market constitutes less than 0.3% of total corporate telecoms 
spend, a· worst case scenario for the TOs wilJ  be a Joss  of market share of 0.03%, or 
ECU 10 million,  to satellite service suppliers.  Even if one considers only the market 
segments where satellite services are traditionally strong, the worst case net impact is a 
reduction of  0.06%.  Losses of  this magnitude would have no significant impact on the 
TOs' overall business. 
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AnnexN 
Cost Models 
Note: costs in each of  the foiJO\\'ing models are expressed in ECU. 
Pogc 1 
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ONE \\'AY STAR DATA SERVICES 
•  Number of  customers 
•  Number of  terminals per customer 
•  lnfQnnation data rate 
•  Modulation and coding scheme 
•  Occupied  bandwidth~ including Guardbands 
•  Overall transponder occupancy 
PogtJ 
10 
200 
128kbit/s 
QP~K  1/2 rate FEC 
211.2kHz 
75% 
!Nota  TI>UII....,.Iy,-.sporl-.spor 
nwnues.  customer  rerm'"ol 
J  Re,•enues  I  600000j  60000  300
1 
i 
I  Cost per  Cost per  Percenlllge oj 
..  I  Unit Con  Unrrs  (..on fHIT month !  Customer  Termtnol  rDtalcon 
F"ued Costs  I  ! 
2  Hub (mel Network Mr.mt)  1000000  I  1333:  133;  4  2.oe  .... 
3  Space Se1171'cnt  5SOOOOOI  1  35152;  3S85t  II  a  ...  ,.  .,  Billing Centre  ~00000  I!  4)671  417!  2  1.0% 
s  l()pcnlions swr (per annum)  30000  JO  25000i  25001  13'  6.1% 
Variable Costs  I  I 
6  TcrmiWs  30001  2000  1666671  16667  13  40.7% 
7  Tcrreslri:d Circuits  32$24!  .  10  27103  2710  14  6.6% 
8  Salesi.:.Mikg  I  '  600001  6000,  JOI  14.6% 
9  Mainten~ncc  1:. Repair  300001  30001  1sj  7.3% 
Working Carltal 
JO  S1ocks  SOOOO!  sooo  25  12.2% 
JJ  Debtors  73971  7401  4  1.~ 
12  CtediiDrS  I  -4932!  -493  ·2  ·1.2% 
Total Costs  I  4095111  409~9  205  100.~ 
I 
I  ! 
O.,erati112 Ma~in  !  46~.!  46%!  46%, 
1  Revenue asswnptions are b:lsed on An:llysys estim:nes. 
2  Total cost ofRF equipment, (approx 6an) Dlltennn, modems and monitorinpnetwork management equipment 
Straight line depreciation over 10 years. 
J  ECU 5.5 million is the approximate price of  a EuteJs:~l )6MHz transponder purchased on a non pre-emptibJe 
1oDg term lease.  One 128kbit/s carri.:r ~r  custom.:r.  Monthly costs to the smice provider are calculated 
assuming the SP pa)'S pro rata for capacity (211.2kHz for e:1cl1 of I  0 customers in this case) on a 75% fuJI 
transponder.  In other words. he pays a ))% prc:tnium on capacity because the transponder is not full. 
4  Total cost of  billing hardware. software and  Jru~intennncc contract. Asswne depreciation over I  0 years 
straight line. 
J  I  0 operations staff at ECU )0 000 per person. 
6  Typical receiver (eg Comstream @approx Slk) plus standard 90cm or so antenna and LNB ($500). 
1  Assume German SO km 128khit/s circuit (or 2•64khit/s). 
8  I 0% of  revenues. 
9  S% of  costs. 
10  Assume 10% p.L growth in business. 
30 days stock • no of customers x no oftcnninals pc:r customer x 1/12. 
11  45 days debtors asswning I  0% growtl1 in business. 
12  30 da)os creditors. 
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Two  WAY STAR DATA SERVICES 
•  Number of  customers 
•  Number of  terminals per customer 
•  Outbound Traffic Carrier: 
4 
55 
Information Rate:  128kbit/s, Number: 2, Occupied BJJ' per carrier: 211kHz 
•  Inbound Traffic Carrier, 
Information Rate: 64kbit/s, Nun1ber: 3, ()ccupied BW  per carrier: 105kHz 
•  Modulation and coding scheme  QPSK 1/2 rate FEC 
•  Occupied bandwidth, including Guardbands  526kHz 
•  Overall transpon~er occupancy  75% 
Notes 
Ttxal-loly I  ~per  1-....  per 
1\!\~nucs  custot,er  tenn,ol 
J  Revenues  330000  r.soo  ISOO 
Ct»tPtrr  C-MtPer  Perc.mage of 
Unit Cost  Untu  Cost ptrrllfOIIIh  CustOttter  Tenninal  total cost 
Foed Costs 
2  Hub (incJ Network Mgmt)  21SOOOOI  I  n1so1  59381  108  11.6% 
J  Space Sepcnt  ssooooo  J  ~5716  89291  162  17.S% 
4  Billins Centre  7500001  I  6250  1563  28  3.1 •  .,. 
.s  Operations Staff  (per .nnua1)  300()0  IS.  ~7SOO  9:-?SI  170  18.3% 
Variable Costs 
6  Terminals  5000  2201  30556,  76~91  139  14.9% 
7  Tcnutrial Circui11  3~5~  .. 1 
"' 
IOUJ  2710  49  5.3% 
8  Sales &  Mtk1_  ~30001  a~so  ISO  16.1~· 
9  Maintcn.ncc ~  Repair  I  165UO!  4125  15  I.J•~ 
Working Capital 
JO  Stock~  9JCi7!  2~92  42  4.5% 
JJ  Dcbtcn  :  4068j  10)7:  18  2.0~· 
11  Credikn  I  I  -~71~:  ·678  ·12  ·1.3•4 
Total Costs  ~O.a6~6~  SJI S9l  930  100.0% 
I  I  I  I 
Operating Margin  61~.  61~•  61•,. 
l  Revenue assumptions are based on  Anal~'S)'S estimntes. 
2  Total cost ofRF equipment. (approx 9m) antc:tUUl. modcns and monitorinpnetwork ~gement  equipment. 
Straight line depreciation over J  0 years. 
J  Eutelsat 36MHz transponder as in previous case.  lnbolUtd and outbotmd cmriers per customer as shown., 
Assume SP pays pro rata for capacity ou a 75% full transponder. 
4  Total cost ofbilling hardware, software and maintenance contract. Depreciation over 10 years straight line. 
5  lS operations staff at ECU 30 000 per person 
6  l.lm 1  Watt Hughes type PES complete with modem. 
7  Assume German SO tm 2•64kbit/s circuit (no fractional bit rutcs offered on national services). 
8  10% of  revenues. 
9  S% of  revenues. 
10  AssUme 10% pa growth in business. 30 da~'S stock= no of  customers x no oftcmninals per customer x.l/12. 
ll  45 da)'S debtors asswning I  0% growth in business. 
12  30 days creditors. 
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TV UPLINKI.NC SERVICES 
•  Number of  customers 
•  Occupied bandwidth. including Guardbands 
•  Overall transponder occupancy 
Rtnv:I'IWS per 
cuslcmJer per 
Note1  lftonth 
J  Re\•enues  S-40000 
Pt:r CustDIIJer 
Unit Cost  Unitl  ,.,.  1t1onth 
Fixed Costs 
2  Hub (incl Nct"vrt Mpml)  1000000  l  ·~:t~ 
3  Space Segment  5500000  I  458:0:0~ 
" 
Operations S1.alf (per annum)  )()(I()()  s  l:!SOO 
Variable Costs 
J  TCITC'IIrial Circuits  .CSI78~  I  31~2 
6  Sales 8:. Markctinr  4~43 
7  Maintenance I:.  Rcp~~ir  :!172 
Total Costs  5:!.~914 
Operatin~ Maruin  3~. 
J ·  Revenue nsstunptions arc: oosed on Analysys estimales. 
p~,.,  of 
rOIQ/ cost 
1.6~. 
17.5•/. 
:!.4~. 
7.:-•.ra 
0.8'!·· 
0.4~. 
100.0% 
Poge5 
1 
36MHz 
100% 
2  Total cost ofRF equipment. (npprox·6m) nnh:tu1n, modems nnd tnonitorin(!!network mana!en_lent equipment 
Straight line depreciation O\'er I  0 ye:1rs. 
J  Eutelsat 36MHz transponder non prc:-emptible  Jon~ tenn lease:. 
4  5 roWld the clock opc:rations st.niT nt ECU  ~u 000 pc:r person. 
5  Assume Gennnn 50 km 128kbiVs circuit (or 2•64kbiVs!) 
6  J  0% of revenues. 
7  5% of revenues. 
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Annex B/ 
Documentation of  a Market Model of  EC Telecoms 
1/ INTRODUCfiON 
This annex reports on  the results of the first  task  of this  study.  the  development of a 
model to estimate the size of  the telecoms services market in the European Community. 
Accurate  estimates of the size  of each  service segment  are  developed,  together with 
methodologies for breaking down the market into constituent parts appropriate to the 
regulatory  policies  a~d framework  which  the  Commission  is  pursuing.  This  aMex 
looks in detail at the revenues derived from  business customers in order t~ identify the 
proportion of  these revenues which accrues from 'corporate networks' and from 'closed 
user groups' (CUGs).  The structure of  this task is illustrated in Exhibit 1. 
The annex is broken down into eight sections: 
•  After this introduction. Sections 2 and  3 look  at  total  TO  revenues from  Member 
States; their breakdown between network service revenues and revenues from other 
sources; and the split of  network service revenues between the constituent services. 
•  Section 4 looks at the split between residential  and  business revenues,  and  breaks 
this down by service. 
•  We then look in detail at business telecoms spend (Section 5) and consider ho\Y it is 
broken out between corporate network applications (Section 6), CUG applications 
and  public use  (Section  7).  A number  of methods  of splitting  CUG  and  public 
communications  are  considered.  The  resulting  differences  in  market  estimates 
between each method are highlighted. 
•  Comparisons  have  been  drawn  between  Analysys's  estimates of market  size,  and 
those published by CIT research.  Section 8 provides a reconciliation between the 
two approaches. 
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EXHIBIT 1:  Structure of  market assessn1e11t 
Total TO Revenues 
I 
' 
Total TO 
Service Revenues 
Residential 
Revenues 
Corporate 
Network Revenues 
' 
Business 
Revenues 
2/ TOTAL TELECOMS REVEJ\'UES 
' 
CUG and Public 
Revenues 1 
'---"'""I  CUG and Public  I 
I  ~-e:':~~=~~----i_  __ _ 
~  :  r----------------
.  .  ·--. 
·--: 
;  ; 
·--~ 
I 
1 
CUG and Public 
Revenues n 
An estimate for the total revenues earned from telecoms services within the Community 
in 1991 was established as folJows: 
•  Total reported turnover for each of  the dominant TOs in the 12 EC Member States 
plus Mercury Communications Ltd of  the UK I were summed. 
f  All rcvcnuc data was collcc:\ed in Joc:at CUrTCI\C:.1" but h:as bHn convened into ECU ~tlhc  ~ppropria.te exchange rate for tht year. 
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•  Added to this were estimated  revenues accruing to satellite service providers such 
as  Maxsat,  Telepon  Europe,  and  Unisource  Satellite  Services.  Other  operators 
such as Kingston Communications. and mobile operators such as Mannesmann and 
SFR were excluded from consideration. 
•  Where gaps existed in these figures,  data was taken from the ITIJl.  Where values 
were unobtainable from  either source extrapolation from  previous years data was 
used to arrive at estimated figures. 
After summing the figures for each operator, the total TO revenues in  1991  amounted 
to ECU 86.5 billion. 
3/ TO SERVICE REVENUES 
The  figure  of ECU  86.5  billion  for  total  TO  revenues  in  1991  includes  revenues 
obtained  from  non-fixed  network  services  such  as  the  sale  of CPE,  revenues  from 
cellular mobile and paging subsidiaries, and investment and finance activities.  However, 
because these activities fall outside the scope of  this study. it was necessary· to estimate 
revenues from  individual  fixed  network services.  These were summed  to produce an 
estimate of  total network service revenues within the Community of  ECU 77 billion, as 
ilJustrated in Exhibit 2 (below).  The services included in this figure were PSTN, PSDN, 
ISDN,  telex.  telegram.  leased  lines.  VPN,  and  sateJiite  services.  The  figures  were 
compiled from data in annual  reports where available,  and  other industry sources such 
as ITU. 
EXHIBIT2:  Total EC Network ...  ~·e111ice Reve1n1es (199 1) 
Service  Revenues (ECll millions) 
PSTN  67990 
PSDN  3314 
Leased line  5640 
VPN  220 
Satellite  110 
TOTAL  77274 
2  mJ  JOUR'Ir det:ails. 
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PSTN Revenues 
PSTN revenues  were quoted  separately by  seven  out of the twelve TOs in  Europe. 
However,  because  definitions  in  annual  accounts  can  vary,  ITU  data  was  used  for 
consistency.  In  all  cases,  ITU  data  was  compared  with  TO  annual  accounts .data. 
Where  differences  existed  between  'telephony  figures  in  annual  accounts  and  ITU 
figures, these were insignificant.  PSTN revenues within the EC in  1991  were estimated 
at ECU 68  bill~  on or 88% of  tot~J network revenues. 
Leased Line Revenues 
Revenues  from  leased  line  services  were  quoted  in  the  annual  reports  of seven 
operators.  Figures for the other operators were estimated  by  applying the European 
average ratio of  leased lines to network service revenues. and then modifying that ratio 
taking into consideration estimates from other industry sources.  By this method, leased 
line revenues were estimated at ECU 5.6 billion in  1991, accounting for 7.3% of  total 
network revenues.  In comparison, the US  market stands at about $7 billion, or around 
6% of  the total market (however the volume of  circuits in the US is several times that in 
Europe). 
PSDN Revenues 
The PSDN figures were derived by summing PSDN. ISDNJ. telex and telegram figures 
obtained  directly  from  annual  reports  (where  they  were  separately  identified)  or by 
using ITU data.  Again. the resulting data was checked against other industry estimates 
from  organisations such as Data Strategies and  CIT.  Total PSDN revenues for  1991 
were estimated at ECU 3.3 billion, 4.3% of  network revenues. 
VPN revenues 
Very little data is currently available for VPN revenues in Europe.  Indeed, in  1991, few 
if  any VPN or outsourcing contracts had been signed.  The size of  the VPN market was 
therefore estimated, based on the assumption that VPN is offered initially as a  privat~ 
network replacement, and in  particular a replacement for heavy expenditure on large 
leased lines carrying voice traffic.  The UK is currently estimated to account for 80% by 
3•  Jt  is probably reasonable to assume  IIICIIId  ISDN  vaffi~ is aill d:na.  But  as &he  nwlet crows  Ibis  assumption "ill become 
inc:rasingly CIT'OnCOUS when ISDN ,_,;n bt  CPILCidcrcd a t~t:and alt~  puhlic n.erwotl unicc. 
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volume  and  60%.- by  revenue  of  the  2Mbitls  leased  line  market  in  the  EC. 
Organisations with 2Mbit/s leased circuits "'ill have the strongest incentive to purchase 
VPN, since they have a high expenditure on leased lines. are the organisations that offer 
the greatest economies of scale to the TOs.  and  will  already  have  the basic  rate of 
access presently required  for  access  to  VPN  services.  In  an  earlier study  Analysys 
estimated  that  the  size  of the  UK  VPN  market  is  currently  won~ approximately 
£100 million.  Scaling this figure up using the above methodology gave a 1993 estimate 
for Europe of  ECU 220 million. 
Busi11ess Satellite Service Rellf!lllles 
Total business satellite service revenues in the EC were estimated at ECU 11 0 trullion in 
1991, that figure being obtained through two routes. 
The first considered revenues reported by TOs in annual reports, and estimates of  TO 
revenues from other industry sources.  This gave a figure of  ECU 72  million for 1991. 
However, this included revenues from  broadcast services (  eg commission from leasing 
Eutelsat transponders for broadcast purposes.  and  uplinking  TV channels to Eutelsat 
and  Astra).  which  were not  part  of the  market  under consideration.  Moreover, the 
figure  excluded  revenues  from  other independent  business  service providers such  as 
Maxat, Teleport Europe, and Polycom. 
The second  approach  used  available  data  on  installed  terminals  from  Comsys and 
Analysys, combined with Analysys estimates of average revenue per terminal.  A total 
of approximately  8000  one  way  data  terminals.  1800  two  way  data  terminals,  and 
16000 business TVRO terminals were installed  in  the Community in  1991.  Average 
revenues  per terminal  were assumed  to  be  ECU 200.  ECU  1500 and  ECU 300 per 
month  respectively'  and  by  multiplying  this  up.  a  figure  of ECU  11 0  million  was 
reached for total revenues. 
This figure was cross-checked with the data available from TOs. The Comsysl  Analysys 
data suggested that 44% of  one way terminals. and 66% of interactive terminals were 
4  Aaalys)'l estimates that in 1991 conlinen\al TOs oluined 0\'Cf' l •  .S times 1M revenue per lMbi&IJ cin:uits than the UK  Eamdala 
IUJPIU lhat TO 1ariffs in Oennany were appoximately 6 times great.er 1hln in the lfK. while in Fnnce they was twice a.~ 
for these rasons, we estimate tmt tht lJK's sh:u'e of nwket m'm\lcs is lo"'er th:m  ils sh:ue of circuits inslalled.  Hawcver. 
Ylrialions in tari8" stNclures and CUS\omer utiliatian p:alta'n$ ..W.c acc:ur:atc estntation very difticull 
.S  Revalues II"C aaumed to  be  for  equipment MUIIIcuinr,. and transmission  capacity only. No additional  value  added ICf'\lioe 
clement is included in this fipre.  As.  an  illustr2tian. we exclude any c:h:uJes that would  be nwlc for the followinc senices: 
programme m:ak.ing acti\oities in lhc services otlercd by SIS. business TV nctworb. or SNO~  information added to a da&a DCIWCJrk. 
ICr'Yice; any manacement element acSdai to I  nclwori.: sen;" other than for aM maintm:ance and monitoring of  the ~Oit. 
c:haMel. 
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provided by TOs.  Under the above pricing assumptions. the estimated revenue share of 
these segments to TOs was 58%.  Applying this across to the whole market produced a 
total market size of  ECU 125 million.  However~ this included revenues accruing to the 
TOs from  broadcast services and.  bearing this in  mind.  a figure  of ECU  11 0  million 
seemed again to be a reasonable estimate. 
4/ 1\f.ETHODOLOGY FOR CA TEGORISlNG BUSINESS AI\'D RESIDENTIAL EXPENDITURE 
Having established total TO revenues by service. a model to categorise this expenditure 
between different  customer groupings was then developed,  as illustrated in  Exhibit 3 
opposite.  The first  sub-division applied was between revenues derived from business 
users, and revenues derived from  residential  users.  The source of business revenues 
was then examined  more closely,  in  order to estimate the value of traffic (i) arising 
through intra-corporate communications (corporate networks); (ii) arising from closed 
user  group  communications~ and  (iii)  arising  from  'public  communications'.  The 
definition  of each  of these  categories  is  the  subject  of much  debate.  and  panicular 
attention was paid to how varying the definition of CUG communications altered the 
distribution of  sourced revenues. 
Business and Residential Split 
The split  between  residential  and  business  revenues  was  estimated  on  a  service  by 
service basis.  It was assumed that residential users subscribe only to PSTN and PSDN 
services. 
The PSTN distribution  between business  and  residential  markets is  not published  by 
TOs in any aMual reports.  In a previous study for the CEC.  Ana1ysys  estimated this 
split for each Member State in  1990 and a ratio of business to residential revenues of 
47:53 was obtained for the Community as a whole.  The individual country ratios which 
had made up this overall split were compared to other published estimates..  The overaU 
split was now applied to the 1991  PSTN totals. since there was no reason to believe 
that the ratio had changed significantiy between 1990 and  1991. producing a figure for 
· total business PSTN revenues of ECU 3 1  661  million  and  for total  residential  PSTN 
revenues ofECU 36329 million. 
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EXHIBIT 3:  Model of  the EC Teleconts Market 
Satellite 
PSDN 
PSDN 
PSTN 
Revenues  LL 
from  Re\'enues from 
Business  -public' calls 
Customers 
PSTN  Closed  VPN 
PSDN  User 
Group 
LL  Re\'enues 
PSTN  ----------
PSDN  Corporate 
Network 
Revenues 
Revenues 
from 
Residential 
Customers  PSTN 
In addition  to  the PSTN  service,  it  was  assumed  that  residential  users  contribute in 
small  measure to  PSDN  revenues,  by  accessing  X.25  networks  and  services  such  as 
Minitel,  BTX,  Compulink,  Prestel,  and  other  European  public  data  systems.  An 
estimated 5% (ECU  I  03  million) of  total PSDN revenues are sourced from residential 
users, but  it  is  unlikely that  residential  subscribers make  significant  use of any of  the 
other services considered. 
Total  residential  revenues  therefore  amounted  to  ECU  36.4  billion  for  1991.  By 
inference, corporate subscribers contributed ECU  40~8 billion to the TOs and  satellite 
service providers.  Exhibit 4 outlines the breakdown of each category of subscriber by 
service, and Exhibit 5 graphically illustrates this distribution. 
_Analy..sy.s --~---------------
ANNEXB Pagcl4 
EXHIBIT4: 
PSTN 
PSDN 
Leased line 
VPN 
Satellite 
Total 
EXHIBIT 5: 
V) 
Cl> 
='  c 
Cl> 
> 
40000 
35000 
~- 30000 
-~ :§  25000 
~ frl  20000 
V,) -- ~  15000  ... 
~  '-
Cl>  z 
10000 
5000 
0 
Aua~l'S)'J Rcponfor CEC DG XIII 
EC Business and Residential Network Sen,ice Revenues (1991) 
Business  Rc:sidcntia/  Business  Residennal 
ECV millions  ECU millions 
31661  36329  47%  53% 
3211  103  95%  5% 
5640  0  100~~  0% 
220  0  100°/o  0% 
110  0  100%  0% 
40842  36432 
Business and Residential Network Sen'ice Revenues  for EC 
(1991) 
Business  Residential 
•  Satellite 
IOVPN 
i  Leased line I 
I 
111111  PSDN 
•  PSTN 
S/  REVENUES FROM BUSINESS SUBSCRIBERS 
Revenues from  businesses  can  broken  down  into  three  classes - corporate network 
revenues,  revenues from  Closed  User Groups.  and  revenues from  'public'  services -
broadly defined as follows: 
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•  Corporate  Network  revenues:  those  revenues  accruing  from  communications 
between sites of  the same company 
•  Closed  User  Group  revenues:  those  revenues  accruing  from  communications 
between users with some form of  close business association 
•  PubJic traffic: revenues accruing from all other communications. 
These definitions  are,  however,  t9,0  imprecise  to  be  useful  in  defining. and  regulating . 
the competitive environment within the Community.  It is possible to interpret them in 
an  extremely  restrictive  sense,  such  that  meaningful  competition  is  impossible  to 
achieve.  However,  a  much  broader  interpretation  is  also  possible,  which  would 
completely  open  up  the  corporate  communications  market  to  competition.  In the 
following sections, the above definitions are refined in order to segment this market in 
greater detail. 
6/ CORPORATE NETWORK SERVICES 
6.1 Definition of Corporate Nem'orks 
Corporate,  or private,  communications  services  were  defined  in  this  study  as  those 
services  used  exclusively  for  communications  v.rithin  an  organisation  i.e.  intra-
organisation communications.  This definition included both 
•  communications  between  sites  belonging  to  the  same  company  such  as  between 
each site in a retail  chain~ and 
•  communications  between  the  sites  of separate  companies  which  are  owned  or 
controlled by a common organisation 
irrespective of their geographical  location.  Communications services  used  to provide 
intra-corporate  communications  include  the  public  switched  telephone  network, 
terrestrial  leased  lines,  private  and  public  switched  data  networks,  private  satellite 
circuits and networks, and Vinual Private Networks. 
Eurostat  estimates  that  10.6  million  out  of the  11.6  million  companies  they  have 
identified in the Community employ fewer than  1  0 people.  The vast majority of  these 
will be single site organisations, therefore a consideration of corporate network traffic 
should focus primarily on large and medium-sized organisations. 
The  key  point  to  note  in  the  definition  given  above  is  that  both  public  and private 
communications services are used  to provide intra-corporate communications.  In the 
~  traffic  of this  nature  carried  over  the  public  network  is  generated  either  by 
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companies which are too small to take economic advantage of private leased lines or by 
large  companies  whose  private  facilities  carry  only  a  pan  of their  inter-site  :raffic. 
Large companies need to manage use of  capacity effectively. i.e.  using PSTN or PSDN 
during the busy hour when the private networks would otherwise become congested. 
This is more economical than leasing generally under-utilised private lines. 
In mainland Europe. different tariff structures for leased lines make them  uneconomic 
for all but the largest organisations."  In these cases, the majority of private circuits are 
used  for  data only,  with  the PSTN being  used  almost  exclusively  for  voice  traffic 
(mcluding intra-corporate voice traffic). 
6.2 Estimate of the Corporate Network Market 
Our basic hypothesis  was  that  the level  of intra-corporate communications  is  driven 
primarily by the number of sites a company occupies and by the nature of its business, 
~ther  than by the services to which it subscribes (  eg proportion of  leased line traffic to 
PSTN  traffic).  To  test  this  hypothesis  exhaustively,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
understand the distribution of industrial  sites by  sector in  each  Member State, and  to 
undertake  a  comprehensive  survey  of calling  patterns  within  each  sector  of each 
country,  ~ task beyond the scope of  this study.  However, company and  site data was 
collected and collated. 
After consulting a number of  sources6,  it was found that information on the distribution 
of  the average number of sites per company was available only in  Germany.  and then 
only  on  an  aggregated  sector  basis.  (All  other  sources  provided  establishment, 
employment and enterprise data in irreconcilable formats.) 
In the absence of necessary information,  two different  methodologies were therefore 
adopted to estimate the size of  the market.  The first method derived corporate network 
expenditure from a UK industry survey, and then applied the results to the remainder of 
the  Co~unity.  The  other  examined  telecoms  spend  sector by  sector  across  the 
Community to estimate the proportion of  calls made to sites within a corporation. This 
second method was also used in the definition and estimation of  CUG revenues. 
6  ~  coasuhed wert Euraut. ETCO. Scican audy for th.: CEC. 1b: Ccn&ral  Sta~isti=l Office. lhc lnstiwtc National  de  Ia 
SLalisliquc et des etudes Ecmamiqucs. F~l  S~tiJtical om~  (GtmW1y}. Oqwtment ofEmplaymcnt (l.fh). £uromonitor. 
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Method 1: lise of  l/K Survey Data Applied to the EC as a Whole 
The limited survey data available for the UK was used to estimate the total percentage 
of  corporate revenues accruing from total intra-corporate communications.  The survey 
produced  the  fo11owing  data  for  the  breakdown  of business  telecoms  expenditure 
amongst the sample population of  large and  mediu~  sized companies. 
EXHIBIT6:  Business Telecoms Expenditure by Sen,ice 
Size  Tumoverin  Percentage of  total telecoms spend: 
ECU millions  P.ITN  Leased lines  Other1 
Large  > 130  50%  45%  S% 
Medium  13 to 130  75%  25o/o  00.4 
Small  < 13  100%  00.4  00.4 
'Large' organisations generally have a large number of sizeable sites,· leading to a high 
density of  leased lines, and a high level of  intra-organisational communications.  Exhibit 
6 illustrates that 45%  of telecoms  expenditure for  the  'large' category was on  )eased 
lines.  On the assumption that this represents 75% of  total intra-organisational traffic 
for these large organisations, an estimated 60% of  their total telecoms expenditure was 
on intra-organisation communications.  This figure seems reasonable when compared to 
those  genera1Jy  quoted  by  telecoms  managers  of large  multi-nationals  for  corporate 
communications (around 50%). 
Medium-sized organisations have, on average, fewer sites per organisation and each site 
is,  on  average,  be smaller.  Consequently,  the density  of both  leased  lines,  and  intra 
organisational traffic will  be lower.  It was assumed  that  leased-line expenditure only 
accounts  for  60%  of intra-organisation  traffic  in  these  organisations.  Applying  the 
figure  for leased  line  expenditure  in  Exhibit  6 produced  an  estimate of 40% of total 
telecoms spend. 
The survey data also confirmed that the small companies category had zero expenditure 
on leased lines.  Since the vast majority of  small companies are single site organisations, 
it was estimated that only  1% of  communications expenditure in this category was on 
intra-organisational traffic. 
1  Includes VPN 
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Data from BT illustrates the distribution of telecoms expenditure amongst these three 
company  size  categories,  as  shown  in  Exhibit  7.  It was  assumed  that,  to  a  first 
approximation. the size categories in Exhibits 6 and 7 are the same. 
EXHIBIT7:  Telecon1s Erpenditure by Orgm1isationa/ Si:e 
Size  Number uf  lines per company  Percentage of  total business 
rt\'enues 
Large  >21  24o/o 
Medium  6 to 20  42% 
Small  J to 6  34% 
Combining these two sets of  data allowed the calculation of  intra-corporate revenues as 
a percentage of total business telecoms spend.  For example,  large companies spend 
60% of  24%, ie 14% of  total revenues on intra-corporate communications.  These two 
sets of results, breakdown of intra-corporate revenues by service, and  as  a percentage 
of  the total market, are summarised in Exhibit 8 below. 
EXHIB/T8:  l!K intra-corporate coJnn1unicatio11S 
Size  Intra-corporate  Breakdown nf  Breakdown of  Intra-corporate 
communicatiom: as  intra-cor{X)rate  i  ntra-corporale  rewmues as a 
a percentage of  rel'enues (I)  revenue.\· (2)  percentage of  total 
companJ•'.t telecoms  %P.~TN  % Lea.ted line  business market 
spend 
Large  60%  25%  75o/o  14% 
Medium  40%  40%  60%  17% 
Small  1%  100%  0%  0.3o/o 
In the ~  leased lines are extensively used by large and medium sized organisations for 
both voice and data.  As noted  above~ this is different to the case in  most of  the rest of 
the Europe, where PSTN is used almost exclusively for voice, and PSDN1 is  used for 
data.  However, if  the distribution of  sites per company per sector is similar, and prices 
as  measured  by  a  basket  of representative  services  are  similar,  then  the  overall 
expenditure on intra-corporate communications should be broadly the same. 
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As discussed above it  was not  possible to confirm that the distribution of sites is the 
same across  all  Member  States.  However't  it  was  established  that  business  service 
prices in France and  Gennany, as measured  by the Oft e)  basket, were within  10% of 
those in the UK.  In Italy prices were 20% higher than both the UK and Gennany.  This 
implies  that  although  the  services  used  are  different,  corporations  across  the 
Community spend broadly the same to transfer a given volume of traffic from one site 
to the other.  · 
UK  estimates  were  then  applied  to  the  EC  market  as  a  whole.  Summing  intra-
corporate  revenues  for  large,  medium.  and  small  companies  (Exhibit  8)  gave  an 
estimate of approximately 32% of total business telecoms spend, an EC total of ECU 
13 billion. 
Method 2: Sector Analysis 
. 
Intra-corporate expenditure was estimated on a sector by sector basis using the NACE 
categorisation system.  For each sector, the ratio of  internal calls going off-sit~ vs those 
remaining on-site't and the ratio of  external calls made to internal calls. were considered. 
To arrive at these estimates a model  was developed. based  on the typical  numbers of 
sites per company in  ~ach sector. and  on the nature of  the business activity, especially 
the level of contact with customers and  suppliers.  Sector estimates of intra-corporate 
spend  as  a  percentage of total  telecoms  spend  \Vere  then  produced,  and  the sector 
spend on telecoms was multiplied  by this figure to arrive at  a total  intra-organisation 
spend figure. as is illustrated in Exhibit 9. 
By this method  it  was concluded  that approximately 35% of total  business telecoms 
spend is intra-corporate. with a value of ECU  14  billion.  This figure is  similar to that 
derived using Method 1. 
Conclusio11s 
From  the  above  methods,  we  conclude  that  expenditure  on  corporate  networks 
accounts for approximately one third of  all  business expenditure on telecoms services. 
This equates to approximately ECU I 3 billion per aMum.  It must be emphasised that 
both  of these  methods  rely  to  a  large  degree  on  judgement  based  on  personal 
experience, and as such they provide good general indicators of the level of spend in 
this category. rather than accurate estimates. 
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EXHIBIT9:  Sector spend and intra-corporate spend 
Sector  Telecoms s~n,ic~  lntrn-corporale  Intra-corporate 
spend, ECU billions  spend as % of  total  spend, ECU billions 
Energy and water  0.7  26%  0.2 
Mining and  1.5  26o/o  0.4 
chemical industry 
Metal manufacture.  2.1  26%  0.5 
electrical 
engineering 
Other manufacturing  1.9  26%  0.5 
Building and civil  0.8  15%  0.1 
engineering 
Distributive trades.  10.3  35%  3.6 
hotels, catering. 
repairs 
Transport and  3.3  33%  1.1 
communication 
Finance and business  12.9  38%  4.9 
services 
Other services, incl.  7.1  43%  3.0 
government 
Total ECU  40.6  35o/a  14.3 
7/  CLOSED USER GROUP S£RVJC£S 
7.1 Definitions of  Closed User Groups 
Closed user group (CUG) services are used solely for communication between entities 
with  an  existing  commercial  or  professional  relationship,  who  make  an  explicit 
agreement to use a network or networks for the  provision of communication services 
between  their  respective  organisations.  Communications  typically  take·  place  within 
vertical or horizontal market segments. 
The definition of  who may participate in a closed user group (CUG) is obviously crucial 
to the process of  detennining the impact of  CUG networks on European telecoms.  The 
problem  is to devise  a definition  which  allows  organisations  with  common  business 
interests, according to the spirit of  the definition. to form CUGs.  It is equalJy important 
that  those  organisations  with  no  common  interests,  according  to  the  spirit  of the 
definition, should be prevented from forming CUGs. 
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Two critical questions wiU  determine the  size~ and  therefore the impact,  of the CUG 
market: 
•  How easy is it to join the CUG ? 
•  W}lat regulatory body should decide who can join? 
One way of  defining the CUG is to specify what it should exclude, but this is a long and 
invariably incomplete process.  It seems likely that this approach would lead to a broad 
definition  of CUGs.  and  they would  consequently  be  relatively  easy  to fonn.  For 
example,  a  minimum  level  of exclusion  would  only  cover  ad-hoc  communications 
between entirely independent entities, and personal calls made by employees, etc. 
However, the converse is  also true:  by  drawing up  an  explicit  list  of who can form 
CUGs,  the definition  will  become  very  restrictive~ and  will  act  as  a  disincentive  to 
fanning such a network.  Indeed~ the creation and operation of  an approval body (in the 
form  of a CEC organisation,  a  national  regulatory  authority,  or a  series of industry 
sector-specific organisations) is likely to severely restrict take-up, even amongst those 
entitled to form CUGs. 
Setting up a single EC-wide approval body would lead to a high degree of consistency 
in applying the definition, but such a body is also likely to be perceived as both remote 
and slow.  NRAs would probably have a faster response time. but consistency between 
Member States would be difficult to achieve, as would co-ordination between approval 
authorities for multi-national networks.  Industry associations would also offer speedy 
response and pan-European co-ordination.  However. they would  have problems with 
co-ordinating cross sector networks~ should  they be permitted.  In  short, there is  no 
ideal solution. 
DGIV has  proposed the following  definitions of corporate networks and  closed user 
groups: 
Corporate network 
Govemment CUG 
- . 
. -~  ·- ...  -
'A single organisation encompassing distinct  legal entities, such as a 
company and its subsidiaries or its  branches  in· other Member States 
incorporated under the rele\'ant domestic company law'. 
'Different  institutions  or  services  of  international  and  inter-
governmental organisations'. 
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and Joint Venture 
CUGs 
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'A  common  activity  network.  Jn  this  case,  the  link  between  the 
members of the  group  is  a  conm1on  business  activity  (in  the  broad 
understanding of the  concept).  EX3111ples  of activities  likely  to fall 
into  this  category  are  fund  transfers  for  the  banking  industry, 
reservation  systems  for  airlines,  infonnation  transfers  between 
universities involved  in  a conunon research project,  re-insurance for 
the  insurance  industry,  inter-library  activities.  common  design 
projects'. 
'An integrated business community or 'business web'  encompassing a 
corporation,  partially  owned  subsidiaries,  its  employees  working 
outside  company  premises,  major  suppliers  and  customers  (for 
example, qualified users in support of  another business objective such 
as a technical help desk), or dealers'. 
In  the  following  paragraphs,  we  expand  and  elaborate  on  these  definitions,  giving 
examples  of each  type  of CUG,  a~d discuss  potential  difficulties  arising  from  the 
definitions. 
Joint Venture Networks 
Under this definition,  communication between organisations involved  in  a contractual 
joint veQture is defined as being within the same closed user group. 
Example:  Could  include  the  Airbus  consonium  involving  British  Aerospace, 
Aerospatiale, DASA and CASA.  However, even with this apparently simple definition, 
problems exist.  GEC-Alsthom could interconnect with both GEC and  AJcatel.  Would 
GEC and Alcatel then be  members of the same  CUG because of their joint venture? 
Could an independent seJVice provider offer to service the communications needs of  all 
three organisations together?  Given FIAT's extensive involvement with much of  Italian 
industry, could it set up a CUG covering almost every corporation in Italy? 
Same Industry Sector 
Under this definition, communication between organisations defined  as being within a 
single industry sector could set up a CUG.  Membership of a given sector would be 
. detennined eitl)er by industry categorisation (probably NACE) or by membership of  an 
industry association.  Depending on the size of the CUG segment which is considered 
acceptable, NACE codes could be used, to one, two, three, or even four digits. 
Examples:  SIT  A provides networks for the travel industry worldwide.  This network 
Ilnks airlines and travel agents and allows worldwide booking of  airline tickets.  SWIFT 
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provides  networks  to  the  banking  world  which  allows  rapid  and  secure  financial 
transactions.  Both SWIFT and  SIT A only provide  network  services to organisations 
within their own industry sector and could therefore constitute an acceptable CUG. 
Howev~r, this definition could prevent the formation  of common user groups between 
suppliers and their customers.  One major category of potential users  ~hich would be 
excluded  under  this  definition  is  manufacturers  seeking  to  implement  Just-in-Time 
! 
manufacturing strategies. 
Communication with Government Institutions 
Under this definition,  communication between government institutions ot between any 
I 
organisation and a government institution is defined to be within a Close~ User Group. 
Here,  government  institutions  are  defined  to  include  all  institutions  \of  European, 
national and local government. 
Examples:  Applications that  wo~ld be aUowed within this categol)' inclJde: electronic 
access  to  the  Official  Journal  of the  EC  and  other  CEC  databas~s;  access  to 
_procurement  information  from  national  and  local  government;  commulnication  with 
taxation  authorities;  access  to  public  libraries;  communication  be~een  large 
engineering  companies  and  the  ministries  (e.g.  Defence)  with  whom  they  have 
contracts. 
This  is  an  excellent  example  of a very  restrictive  definition.  where  it  is  easier to list 
those organisations and applications included than those excluded. 
Business relationship 
i 
Under this definition, communication between organisations with any  typ~ of business 
relationship  is  defined  to  be  within  a  CUG.  This  could  include  fra~chisers and 
franchisees,  partners in a large project for a single customer, or organisati  ns involved 
in the same market value chain.  It may be possible to limit the CUG to a  entity's five 
largest .suppl~ers and customers (by traffic volume or by value).  In practide many new 
infrastructure suppliers will only find  it economic to supply Jinks which carry a certain 
minimum volume of  traffic. 
Examples:  This broad definition suggests many examples for CUG  devel~pment.  All 
of the examples quoted in the previous scenarios would be valid  under  th~s definition, 
II 
I 
I 
! 
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together with others such as:  EDI systems for Just-in-Time Manufacture (eg Renault) 
where  reliable  and  frequent  communications  are  required  between  supplier  and 
customer, EDI systems for supennarket ordering; EFTPOS and  credit card  clearance 
systems  allowing  connection  of retail  outlets  to  financial  services  organisation  (  eg 
Visa); medical infonnation networks; networks connecting lawyers and estate agents in 
a single system; networks COMecting delivery finns and their customers. 
In  the case of  value chain networks. it  may be  possible to exclude the final  customer 
from the Closed User Group on the basis that the final  customer pays the full  VAT, or 
that the final  customer is  not incorporated.  However. the policing of such  a system 
would be extraordinarily difficult and expensive, and is probably impractical. 
7.2.  Closed User Group Revenues 
The above scenarios serve to illustrate how difficult it is to define meaningfully a closed 
user group.  tntimately, it appears that the only practical option is to adopt an inclusive 
approach and to define who may, rather than who may not, connect to such a network. 
The role of  the approval body will  be critical in determining the attractiveness to users 
of  such an approach to the market place. 
In  estimating  the  possible  effect  on  revenues  under  each  scenario.  Method  ~ as 
described  in  Section  6  on  corporate  networks  was  used.  The  percentage  of total 
corporate spend made on calls to each of  the categories described above was estimated 
on a sector by sector basis.  The results are illustrated in Exhibits 1  0 and  11  below. 
EXHIBIT 10:  Closed llser Group Expenditure 
Sector  Total CUG spend (ECU billion.\")  %Business spend 
Joint Venture CUG  0.4  1% 
Same Sector CUG  2.6  6% 
Government CUG  0.7  2% 
Customers/Suppliers CUG  2J.8  S4% 
All other Telecoms spend  0.8  2% 
.. 
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It should be noted that Exhibit  J  0 gives estimates for total of  corporate revenues which 
could  be  covered  by  a CUG  definition  and  that  no  attempt  was  made  to  assess  the 
percentage ofthat potential market which would actually use CUG networks to provide 
its communications.  Two major factors wiJI influence take-up: 
•  In general,  80% of communications takes  place between  20%  of the  members  of 
any class.  In practice. therefore. it is likely that only 80% of  the revenues in each of 
the above categories will be contested. 
•  If  the CUG approval process becomes at  aJJ bureaucratic. many potential customers 
will decide that the gains do not outweigh the effort required to set up the network. 
This latter factor is likely to influence the majority of  the potential customer base, with 
the result that the actual impact of  liberalisation on the TOs will be negligible. 
7.3 Conclusions 
From the analysis  in section 7.2  it  can  be  seen that  a broad  definition would make it 
possible to encompass almost all business expenditure on telecoms within the scope of 
either  corporate  network  or  closed  user  group  services.  Only  a  small  fiaction, 
estimated at approximately 2%,  can  be  considered  as  communication with groups or 
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individuals  with  which  the  company  does  not  have  some  form  of business  or 
professional relationship. 
On  the  other  hand,  by  adopting  a  more  restrictive  approach  to  the  definition  and 
authorisation  of closed  user  groups,  it  is  possible  to  define  a CUG  and  corporate 
network  market  that  accounts  for  approximately  50% of all  business  revenues.  By 
exploring further the approaches to CUG definition illustrated here,  it may be possible 
to  define  a_ satisfactory  and  acceptable  process  which  ~llows  competition  tn 
infrastructure to develop in a controlled manner over a period of  transition.  . 
8/ DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANAL  YSYS AND CIT 1\URKET ESTIMATES 
CIT forecast the market for satellite business services  in  its  1993  repon on  satellites. 
Exhibit  12  showns  CIT's  revenues  projections  for  1992.  The  total  market  size  of 
ECU 339 million  is significantly different to estimates prepared by Analysys,  but there 
are two major differences which explain this discrepancy: 
•  CIT's  projections  begin  in  1992  not  1991.  In  some  cases,  CIT quotes  assumed 
growth figures for the previous year; in others. the  1992 figures have been restated, 
using a CAGR figure calculated from  the forecasts given for  1994 and  1996.  On 
this basis, the market in 1991  was wonh approximately ECU 272 million. 
•  CIT estimates include the service element  in  all of the  market  categories forecast. 
For  example,  in  the  case  of SIS,  CIT  included  revenues  received  to  cover 
programme-making activities,  as  is  the  case  with  SNG  and  business  TV  serVices. 
Ana1ysys figures  are,  with the exception of videoconferencing and  SNG,  estimates 
of  the revenues accruing from the provision of space segment capacity and nominal 
rental (as opposed to outright purchase) of  the CPE used to provide the link. 
The size of  the service component in each of the CIT categories was estimated and the 
market  forecasts  adjusted  accordingly.  This  process  resulted  in  a  market  size  of 
ECU 123  million,  which  is  directly  comparable  with  the  Analysys  estimate  of 
ECU 110 million.  The difference of  ECU 13 million, approximately 1  0%, is well within 
the expected margin of  error. 
One surprising figure  is  the revenue accruing  from  SMSIIBS  services.  This  should _  · 
show up  on  the TO  accounts,  but  appears  not  to.  In  a study of Eutelsat  activities, 
revenues from business services were estimated at around ECU 15 million. 
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EXHIBIT 12:  Restaten1ent of  CIT figures. 
Categories  1991  1996  C.AGR  Derived  Service  Transmission 
/992-96  1991  Component  Revenues 
Information Services  87  176  27.0o/o  69  80o/o  14 
SNG•  24  40  77.0o/o  14  SO%  7 
Business TV  18  63  80.0°/o  10  60%'  4 
Video Conferencing  II  18  22.2o/o  9  0%  9 
Managed Trunk  51  74  9.8%  46  0%  46 
TV/Uplinks• 
Managed Data Uplink  14  30  21.0%  12  0%  12 
FM: one way VSA T  3  8  27.8%  2  SO%  1 
FMIMNS: two way VSAT  66  161  25.0%  53  50%  26 
Two way Data (SMSIIBS)  64  100  11.8%  57  0%  57 
TOTAL  338  670  18.7%  272  176 
REST A  TED in Analysys  123 
terms 
Bold figures are pro\'idcd by CIT 
• Excluded from Analysys figures 
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